

A 2
LETTER
FROM A
Clergyman in *London*,
Who hath taken the
OATHS
TO
His Present MAJESTY,
DIRECTED TO
A CLERGYMAN in the Coun-
try, who hath refused them.

L O N D O N:

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LETTER


TO THE

CHANCELLOR



OF THE


UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD



A
LETTER
FROM A

Clergyman in *London, &c.*

My Reverend and dear Brother,



Am heartily sorry to find
by yours, that your Scrup-
les still continue to be
troublesome to you, as
to the Securities now re-
quired by the Govern-
ment from you, which you cannot, you
say, give to it with a clear Judgment,
nor therefore with a safe Conscience.
I heartily congratulate with you, your
truly Christian Resolution to forego

A 2

Your

your Livelyhood, and to sacrifice all Prospects of secular Advantage to the Peace of your own Mind, and to the Views of a far superior and better Interest with God. But if these two Things be not, in the Case before you, Interfering nor Inconsistent ; you agree I know with me, that both of them are valuable in their proper Order ; and you will suffer me to add (what I am sure is your own Persuasion) that if your Mistake should be found to carry with it any bad Consequences to the Society, whereof you are a Member, if any should be led by your Example or Persuasion, to engage in Designs which are hurtful to it ; the meer honesty of your Meaning will be no full excuse to you, except you likewise join with it all fit endeavours to rectify your Opinion, and to get a perfect knowledge of the Matter in Issue.

I will therefore beg leave at present only to suppose a possibility, that you may not clearly nor rightly apprehend the Question now before you, that is indeed, that you are a Man and Fallible. This I know you will easily grant me. What therefore I would
far-

farther beg of you, shall be your leave to lay before you some probable Reasons, which induce me to think, that you are actually under some Error in your present Practice and Perswasion. And,

1. I observe that you took these very Oaths to Queen ANNE, which now you refuse to King GEORGE. Now I cannot for my Life see difference enough between these two Cases, to make the one of them Justifiable, and yet to Stigmatize the other as Unlawful. The *Pretender then* entred his Claim to the Crown, and had as much Right at that time to support it, as can now be pleaded for him: Yet that Pious and Excellent Princess was esteem'd by you, as amply entituled to your Affection and Obedience, as if she had had no Rival. And tho' you are pleas'd to intimate your Suspicions of some Concert between her and her supposed Brother, towards the latter part of her Reign, whereby she was to continue unmolested in her Possession during her Life, and *be* to succeed upon her Decease; yet you do not suggest that you have any
proof

proof of such a Concert ; nor hath any Proof been offered at by those who have it most in their Power, and most in their Will to publish it, if it had any due support from proper Vouchers. And I perswade my self, that you would not build upon the sandy bottom of *Suspitions* and *Supposals*, in a Case of this Consequence to your self and Family. But indeed if this were cleared up to your entire Satisfaction, and you were really sure of such a Concert, I cannot imagine, that there would be any great Matter depending on it, except it had receiv'd the sanction of a Law, and so had in due course revers'd our present Establishment. 'This I am sensible, I must more at large debate with you, before you will come into it : Mean while you will allow me to ask you, what you thought of our good Queen, before this imaginary Concert, whilst her Rival was in Arms against her, and she against him ? Surely there was then no Room nor Colour for any such Apprehension ! When he claimed the Crown from off her Head ; you agreed he had no manner of Right nor Title to it ; you Swore you believed
he

he had none : What *New Right*, I beseech you, hath *since* accrued to him? What Principles can you find out which will justify your Submission to our Government, for any single Year, since the Famous 1688, and will not equally conclude for your Submission to our present Government? I intreat you to bear a little longer with me, whilst I farther question you, what you thought of that Vote, towards the conclusion of our late Queen's Parliament, which set a Price of 100,000*l.* upon the *Pretender's* Head? I well remember what your Sentiments of that Parliament were, and of the major part of its Members; you much esteemed them; you were infinitely fond of them; you thought every thing they did, was Wise and Just, and for the Kingdoms Interest. But now the Case is altered, and the Consequence of your present Persuasion brands the best of Queens as an infamous Usurper; and the Parliament, to which you were so devoted, as partaking with her in her Sin. These Consequences are so plain and natural, that I foresee you will not deny them, but will rather tell me, you were *then* under a Mistake,

and

and that it is high time to *return from whence you are fallen, and to repent*. And it is indeed true, that you ought to follow conviction, whensoever you find it; that it is never too late to be wiser than you were; and that it would not be decent nor generous to bear too hard upon you for any former Errors; when you give such Authentick Demonstration of your readiness to renounce them. Thus far I agree the point with you. But then,

2. I cannot but suspect there is some further Reason for this change of your Sentiments, than what will easily be acknowledged, or perhaps appear even to your own Mind; for very sincere Men may be byass'd in their Judgment of things, by Considerations foreign from the Argument, and mixing unobservably with their Affections and Inclinations. I beseech you therefore, that I may be permitted to ask you, or rather indeed, that you would lay your Hand upon your Heart, and ask your self impartially, whether, if his present Majesty had continued the Parliament he dissolved, and had suffer'd it to dye a natural Death; if he
had

had kept in the old Ministry, and allowed our Friends the same ascendant in his Councils, which the late Queen allowed to them, (whether then I say) you would have thought of transferring your Allegiance, or of disputing his Title? I have not forgot the time, when the very Persons who now openly avow, or secretly favour another Interest, would have complain'd of Calumny and hard Treatment, for being suspected or said to do so. I profess myself one of those, who esteemed their Complaints of this sort to be just and reasonable: Nay I am as sure, as any one Man can be of anothers Sentiments, that *many* (I believe *most* of them) meant their Proessions, and were truly attached at that time to the *Protestant Succession*. They might not perhaps, think it very decent to be always holding a winding-sheet in view of the Possessor, nor to be continually talking upon the disagreeable Subject, of what they would do when their Queen should leave them; but I am fully satisfied, that however they might hope it would be a *distant* Case, they sincerely meant the *Succession* which now hath taken effect amongst us.

B

And

And I must add in support of my present Opinion, that had this been otherwise, I cannot but believe, some measures would have been taken with the last Parliament, to have opened another Scene. For the Queen's Death (tho' her fatal Paroxysm was very sudden) was no improbable event, after that first illness which seiz'd her the *Christmas* before it. Those about her had reason from that time, to apprehend her designed for no long Continuance; so that what they had to do, they easily might see they must do quickly, if they did it at all. They had a Parliament (it will be confessed) as much for their purpose as they could ever propose to have. And yet one of the last things done by that Parliament before the Queen's Decease, was branding the *Pretender's* Interest and Title, and assigning a *premium* to any who should seize him invading these Kingdoms. There hath of late indeed appeared such a turn of Judgment and Affection in many of our Friends, that I am now less fond than I was, of answering for any of their former Practices. But as nothing hath yet convinced me of any former Design to alter the Succession,

Succession, it yet remains to be proved upon them; and we may argue with them and you (who have always for your self and them disclaimed it) as if you had all along meant our present Establishment. The Question then will be, what Reason hath *since* occurred to you, for a change of Sentiments? There hath indeed been a change of Ministry, an Impeachment of our Friends, a signal discountenance given to former Measures, and to the Persons concern'd in them: But must we change our *King*, with every change of *Ministry*? Must there be no Impeachments, but what private Men shall think Wise and Just? And may our Governors commit no Error without being displaced for it? Suppose all this to be *wrong in them*; (which yet is a case by no means before us, nor are we in any manner entituled to the cognizance of it) yet are *we* therefore *Right* in seeking *such* a Redress, even of far greater Greivances? What is become of those *Passive* Principles, which we have so much talk'd of, so much boasted of, and inculcated upon others with so much warmth? Do we think they were made only for the use of *Tories*

against *Whigs*; or are True only in times when *Tories* are in Power?

— *Pudet hac opprobria nobis
Et dici potuisse, & non potuisse refelli.*

Yet with all the Aggravations which the most willing Cenfor can fasten upon the present Management, hath there been any thing like a *Subversion of Government*, which should oblige us to seek for a Resort elsewhere? 'Tis ever and anon objected to our Sovereign, that He is a *Foreigner*: In all Reason therefore He should have the *Excuse* as well as the *Odium* of this Unhappiness; and time should be allowed him for his better Knowledge of *Things* and *Persons*, than it yet hath been possible for him to be possessed of. But instead of this Justice done him, what is our procedure? And how have we endeavoured to make a Friend of him? Have we done any one thing (since He first disobliged us) which hath the least tendency to convince him, that he hath been in any Point Mistaken? have we not rather clinched his Opinion, that the suggestions of our Adversaries against us

us were all well-founded, and that we are not the Men we would have had him esteem'd us? In good earnest, our Conduct hath been such, that our Enemies will be sure to censure us, as deserting our *Principles* for the sake of *Persons*; and as sacrificing the Interest of our King and Country, to Party-Rage, to disappointed Ambition, or to the Resentment of supposed Injuries. Let it be agreed, that these Injuries have been as real and great, as the Men most affected by them can possibly represent them; yet, in any Case besides our own, we should never have thought, that Seditious Pamphlets, and withholding from our Superiors the Acknowledgments otherwise due to them, were proper methods of healing Breaches, or of redressing Grievances: Least of all should we have imagined, that the Interest of our Excellent Church would be safer in the Hands of a *Papist*, than of a *Protestant*; that our exhausted Treasury would ever have been replenish'd, by our acceptance of a Prince engaged in a long Arrear of his own, and a Family Debt; or that our Liberties would be more effectually confirm'd

firm'd to us by calling over a Person to be their Protector, who can never come hither, but upon the foot of an acknowledgement, that they are all at his Mercy. There was a time when we flattered our selves with hopes, that our known Reverence for Government, would have reserved to us the Favour of our Governors: Because those hopes were not presently answered, we flew out and convinced them that we never designed the Fetters of such Principles for our selves, but had only fitted them for others. There is therefore no help for it, but this will ever be objected to us, and will stand against us as an indelible blot of Reproach and Infamy, if none of us will assist in removing so foul a Scandal. I am sure, our patient submission to the *Treatment* we shall receive (after having gone so far towards deserving it, if not by our *first*, yet by our *after-Management*) will be more likely to bring things towards our Wishes, than undutiful Returns and seditious Behaviour. I am aware all this while, that you act for your self upon a very different sort of Principle, from what I have here been so free in censu-

censuring. You profess the same Obedience, which you have always professed, and are for paying it in the fullest measures, where you think it due. But still the Question recurs, how you came to think so in this Juncture, rather than before, when there is no change of Circumstances, which can now much affect your Reason, tho' there hath been (I confess) a good deal to enflame your Passions? Is there not therefore a very just Suspicion, that your *Passions* may here have been tampering with your *Judgment*, and discolouring the Evidence whereupon you should form it? I have heard it said, that the Provocations given from the *Court*, have made the *Country* look farther into this Question, than would otherwise have been done; But never knew, till now, that a sense of Provocations did in any Instance contribute to clear up a *disputed* Question, tho' it hath often been observed to puzzle a *clear one*, and to dis-concert even the coolest Head. It is no part of my design that this should pass for any Reflection upon your Conduct: But I beg it may have some place in your own Enquiries,

ries, whether you have blended with them no such improper foreign Mixture? Or, if you are above such low inducements, yet I am sure, you know some of our Friends who are acted by them; and therefore, since I write in Print to you, you will excuse me, I hope, for the freedom I take in the mention of them; for it is really confessed and boasted, and even objected to the Politicks of some late Managements, that the *Tories* were, and would have *continued*, in the Interest of our present Establishment, if they had not been disoblged. A scandalous and shameful Acknowledgement to come from Men of their Principles! who have always professed, that their Obedience was paid as their Duty, whether they liked the Counsels on foot or not. We have plainly therefore no way of answering this Imputation, but by disowning the Persons upon whom it is justly chargeable. The main Body of our Friends, I hope, is unconcerned in it; and I heartily wish, the innocent part would take effectual care to distinguish it self from the Guilty!

But

But now, tho' the Juncture which you have chosen for disowning our present Government, should put you, I think, upon enquiring, whether the Reason of the Thing, and a defect of Title, were your real and only Motives, or whether Resentment and prejudice might not mix with them; yet I ought, I am sensible, to proceed no farther with you upon this Topick; it is enough, and perhaps too much, to have thus far touch'd upon it; and therefore 'tis now high time to leave it with your own most serious and impartial Reflections.

I have hitherto aim'd at nothing more than opening my way to the merits of the Cause between us. I am well aware, that by writing for the Government, a Man hath the disadvantage of lying under some untoward Suspicions; and so what comes from him upon such an Argument will have the less Weight with it; But from you who so well know me, I have no such fears. I may appeal to you, whether I have ever in the course of my Publick Life, been guilty of any one Inconsistency between *Profession* and *Practice*; and in short, whether I have not been

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always

always in the same Sentiments which I here publish. I shall truly endeavour to fence off the Charge of serving any Cause besides that of Truth, by keeping my Name (as far as I am able) an inviolable Secret to all but your self. I am content with the Testimony of my own Conscience, in doing what I think my Duty, and have no thought of making my Court to any Man; nor will I suffer my self to dwell upon the consideration whom I shall please or displease by it.

You, by refusing to qualify your self for a Livelihood in your Profession, which you are so well fitted to adorn, give us indeed a convincing proof, that Interest hath no power over your Conscience: I only beseech you to believe, that if my *Conscience* were under the same Convictions with yours, my *Conduct* should be the same; We have the misfortune to view things in a different Light, and so we choose a different Track to go in. *Mine* I assure you is not determined by Force nor Fashion; I have not been surprized into it, nor have I entered upon it without due Consideration. It will not be fair nor generous to battle your
 Prin-

Principles, which it may be inconvenient for you to defend, or to set off with those Colours, which otherwise you know how to manage with such great Advantage. But you will give me leave to lay before you the Reasons of my own Practice; and I perswade my self, that this new, this only difference between us, will not make you an uncandid or an unfriendly Censor of *them* or *me*. My first Enquiry upon this occasion was, whether the Right in question were *Divine* or *Humanè*. For, if it were *Divine*, I was perfectly convinced that Human Powers could do nothing against it. But then I supposed, that a *Divine Right* would be very legible in the Book of God: Now, there I could find no Footsteps of it. Thence I could form no Arguments, could draw no Inferences more in favour of *James Stuart*, (if there be any where such a Person) than of *John Doe*, or of the remotest *Pretender*. There I could not find, that God had in any manner determin'd the particular Form, or Model of Civil Governments, or was indeed more favourable to any one, than to any other sort of them; much less could

I perceive that there was any likelihood of *thence* determining the dispute of a *controverted Succession*, or of reading *there* the name of my King and Governor. *Priority of Birth* had in *some Passages* I found, its Honours paid to it, and in *others*, seemed as much neglected. *Hereditary Right* sometimes took place, and at other times was overlooked ; so that I plainly perceived, that the *Old Testament* would furnish me with no decisive Arguments upon our present Subject. And as to the *New* ; I was soon convinced, that our Saviour's design was to leave these things as he found them ; that as his *Kingdom was not of this World*, he intended to establish no other Kingdom, but what should rule in the Hearts of Men, and carry its Influences to the Conduct of Private Life. Accordingly, when he was desired by a certain Person, to prevail with his Brother for dividing the Inheritance between them, his Answer proved the request improper. *Man, who made me a Judge or a Divider over you ?* And when that insidious Question was put to him, by a sort of Men, who thought it unlawful, as you do, to pay their Acknowledgments

John 18.
36.

Luke 12.
13, 14.

ments to the Powers then in Being —

Is it lawful for us to give Tribute unto Luk. 20. 22

Cæsar or not? His reply was such as ^{24, 25.}

hath fully convinced me, that he designed to determine no such Questions.

Shew me (saith he) *a Penny*, or (as St. Matthew records it) *the Tribute-mony*; ^{Matt. 22. 19.}

which when they had brought to him, he only asked them — *Whose Image*

and Superscription hath it? And upon

their answering and saying, *Cæsar's*, He

said unto them, *Render therefore unto*

Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, &c.

What things were *Cæsar's*, he took

not upon him to determine; but since

the Providence of God had vested

him with the publick marks of Authority and Power, Private Men, (it hence

should seem) had nothing further to

examine; but were to pay him the

usual Acknowledgments which were

due to him; that is (as the Apostle afterwards in the same general way directed)

they were to *Render to all their* Rom. 13.

dues; Tribute to whom Tribute was due; 7.

Custom to whom Custom; Fear to whom

Fear; Honour to whom Honour. They

were not to enter upon the Merits of

the Cause, nor to consider by what

Right and Title these several Dues

were

were

were claimed ; But if to such a Station such Dues were payable, the Question before Private Persons was not, how the Magistrate got into his Station ; but when they found him there, they were to pay him the Respects which were annexed to it. Nor in all the Disputes and contradictory Claims, which were afterwards started about the Imperial Crown, do I remember any single Instance, wherein the Primitive Christians withheld their Obedience from the Person, whom the Senate and People of *Rome* acknowledg'd. Now the *Negative* I thought must here determine me, if no *Positive Evidence* could be produced in proof of a Divine Right. And the *Negative* here is as strong as can be. There is not only no intimation given us of any particular appointment made by God in this matter (which alone were enough to leave all things of a *Positive* Kind in their Native Indifference) but there is moreover, a broad intimation of his direct Refusal to intermeddle with it : Upon the whole therefore, I concluded, that since God had in no manner notified to me his Will, what particular Person was to be the Object of my Allegiance ;

Allegiance; this was a point I was to search out elsewhere; and if the *Divine Law* did not determine me, there was then no Clue to direct me, but what I must derive from the *Ordinances of Man*, and from the Laws and Constitutions of my Country. Now here

I found my Pains much shortned, and the course of my Enquiries made easy to me, by the judicious Collections of our late Reverend Doctor *Higden*; which were published much about the time, when this point lay before me; and I shall just beg leave to mention the particulars, which had then most weight with me. Now

1st. The chief, and I think, decisive observation, which I made upon the Case, as represented by him from the most Indubitable Authorities, was this; that *Hereditary Right* (when taken in its strictest Sense, as the Persons nearest in Blood to the *Rightful* Possessor of our Crown) was never considered by our Laws, as a point essential to our Monarchy, or an unalterable part of our Constitution. Had it been *so* considered, the Consequence must have been, that our Laws could not have acknowledged the Right of any single Prince,

Prince, who sat upon the English Throne, from the Conquest, down to King *James* the First. For the *Cession* of *Edgar Atheling*, upon these Principles, could only affect his own Personal Right, not that of his Heirs; no Act of a Tenant for Life, could injure his Successors; much less could a present Possessor make any change in a Fundamental Article of our Government. Now from a Sister of this *Edgar* sprang a Race of Kings, who were successively Monarchs of *Scotland*, to King *James* (the 6th of *that*; and) the first of our *English* Kingdom. Wherefore, as the Contract made with *William* the Conqueror, upon the Advantage gained by him over King *Harold*, could have subsisted no longer upon a foot of *Right*, than during the Life of the foremention'd *Edgar*; so every Act of Government since that time must have been a perfect Nullity; of our Twelve Non-Hereditary Princes, who succeeded from *William* I. to *Henry* VIII. the Authoritative Acts must have been all disowned; but most especially such of them, as touched upon the Interests or Priviledges of the *Hereditary* Claimants; No Act of Parli-
ment

ment made under a King *de facto* could have the force of Law, except it had been expressly confirmed afterwards by the *de jure* Possessor. *Presumptive Consent* is too weak a bottom for Law to stand upon; and indeed there are Cases upon Record, wherein the *Presumption* must in all Reason lye against such a *Consent*; and yet these Laws have always had an undisputed force. Thus, for instance, a Statute was made in the Reign of K. *Richard II.* which multiplied the Species of Treason, in Favour of the Prince, to the Subject's disadvantage; and this was repealed in the 1. *Hen. IV. ch. 10.* and stands ever since repealed. That is; the *Legislative Authority* of *Henry IV.* (who was only King *de facto*) hath ever since his time, been acknowledged, as Valid and Conclusive against the *Legislative Authority* of his Predecessor *Richard II.* (who was King *de jure*) and the Kings *de jure*, who Claimed and Possessed afterwards upon the *Hereditary foot*, have suffered this among the other Laws of the 3 *Henries*, which were not expressly repealed, to continue in full force; and indeed the whole Tenour of our *English History* is in nothing more clear,

nor are, I believe, the Gentlemen of the long Robe, in any thing more unanimous, than in acknowledging the *Legislative Power* of the *Regnant Prince*; and in allowing his Laws an equal force with those which proceeded from the most undisputed Title; nor can there, I conceive, be named any single instance, wherein the least difference hath been ever made between the Authority of the one and of the other; since they have each of them all along had the force of Laws, till they were expressly repealed. Nay it hath been solemnly adjudged, that Attainders passed in the time of a King *de facto*, against such as bore Arms on behalf of his Rival, (whilst that Rival was out of Possession) did disqualify the Persons so attainted from being *Legal Persons*, or for acting as such, even when that Rival was got into Possession, till the Attainders were in due course of Law reversed. It was always indeed considered as a Maxim, that the *meer Possession of the Crown*, or an *actual entrance upon the Royal Dignity*, did take away all personal disqualifications from the *Regnant Prince*, and so there was no need of reversing *his* Attainder. Thus
favour-

favourable is our Law to *meer Possessions*, without any consideration of the Title. And we have two great Authorities (*viz.* Lord Chief Justice Coke's and Hales's) for interpreting the famous Statute of Treasons (25 Edward III: *ch.* 2.) as meaning by our *Sovereign the King* (against whom such Treasons may be committed) the *King who is in Possession of the Crown and Dignity, tho' he be King de facto and not de jure*; nay even the Persons themselves who claimed as *de jure*, against such as only possessed *de facto*, did not for a long time assume the Royal Title, but contented themselves, with such Titles, as did otherwise belong to them, till they could receive their Regal Title in due Form, from the States of the Realm. And it is farther remarkable of King Henry VI. that when he had enjoyed his Crown for 39 Years, with the entire Cession and Submission of the Hereditary Claimants, (which gave him a most indisputable Title) and was afterwards put out of Possession for 10 Years, and then again recovered it; (I say it is pretty remarkable, that after such recovery) the publick Acts of his Government reckon not those

Ten Years, as any parts of his Reign; but run thus — *In the 49 Year from the beginning of the Reign of King Henry VI. and the first Year of his re-entry upon the Royal Dignity*, and not as if he had Reigned in a continual Course — *in the 49 Year of his Reign*. Nor doth indeed the distinction between a King *de facto* and *de jure* appear in any publick Monument, till a Statute made *1. Edward IV. ch. 1.* where we first have mention of a King *indeed, but not of Right*. Till that time our Constitution seems to have had no Idea of any King, but of the *Possessor* only. These things I do but touch upon, because you will find them deduced to you more at large, and with more Advantage, by that excellent Peice, to which I refer you, and beg you would peruse it with your usual Accuracy and Candor. Yet from these few instances, thus hastily represented, I take it to be clearly and fully manifest; That our Constitution never looked farther, than the present *Possessor*, acknowledged no Right but his, and considered all Defects as amply supplied, by his actual Assumption of the Royal Dignity. Wherefore, if our Laws have
any

any weight with you in this Question, they are far from insisting on your Notion of *Hereditary Right*, or from considering it, as an unalterable part of our Constitution. In the common Course, an eldest Son succeeds to the Throne of his Father, with us; and our Laws do apparently favour his Succession; Nor hath our Present Settlement altered our Constitution in this particular; since the Rule still holds with its proper *Exceptions*; insomuch that if no special Statute had been made for that purpose, our Sovereign Lord King GEORGE would *in Course* have succeeded to the *Throne of his Ancestors*, (as some late Addresses from his two Houses of Parliament, have most Seasonably and Emphatically stilled it) meerly from the disqualification of certain Persons, being *Papists*, who stood between him and the said *Succession*; which therefore hath still a sense, wherein it may truly be called *Hereditary*; and so the Rule continues as it was, tho' Proximity of Blood hath been set aside, in the instance of our present Establishment. The Authority of *Parliament* was however necessary to make this *Exception* in his favour, since

since the *Common Law* could not have done it for him, which always sides with the stricter acceptation of the *Hereditary Title*. With this View, I suppose, some Gentlemen have considered that Title as *Indefeasible*; meaning, I imagine, that our Law did so favour the *General Rule*, that no *particular Exceptions* could be allow'd to destroy it: Accordingly 'tis agreed, nay, 'tis insisted on, that the *Rule* doth still continue; nor will any Man, I conceive, be so hardy, as to say it is abolished, by any present or past *Exceptions* to it. No! For it is interwoven with the very Frame of our Monarchy; which can never become *Elective* without subverting our present *Constitution*, and casting it afresh in quite another Mould. Upon the foot of this Construction, I once subscribed to the *Indefeasible Hereditary Title* of our late excellent Queen. If they who drew up that Address, meant any thing more by it, it was a Secret to *us* (or to *me* at least) who Signed it. I had never any other Notion of that *Technical Term*; and I do by no means think I stand single in this Explication of it: For however we may judge one form of Government

Prefer-

Preferable to another, yet to say strictly of *any*, that it is *unalterable*; or that it is a Sin to submit to a Change of it when made by others; or that any Right which is founded thereupon, cannot be superseded without the *consent* or *Cession* of the *Hereditary Claimant*; are Assertions utterly unsupported by Reason or Scripture; inconsistent with the main Ends of Government it self; and contradicted by the whole Current of our History and Laws. But you shall have more of this hereafter.— Mean while, I observe farther to you,

2. The express Provision made by a most unquestionable Authority, in favour of the Possessor's Title, and in express assertion of the Subjects Duty: This is the famous Statute made 11. *Hen. VII. Ch. 1.* which hath really and truly nothing *new* in it, but is only more explicitly declarative of our *former Constitution*: Now hereby it is pronounced *not Reasonable, but against all LAWS, Reason, and good Conscience, that the Subjects going with their Sovereign Lord in Wars, &c. should loose or forfeit for doing their Duty and service of Allegiance.* The Preamble of it sets forth, that their duty of Allegiance requires

quires this Service to be paid by them to their *Prince and Sovereign Lord for the time being*: And the close of it *discharges them of any Trouble, Vexation, or Loss, for that Deed or Service*. The conclusion of all hath indeed precluded any Advantage which might hence be taken in favour of a future Rebellion; and therefore they who should afterwards *decline from their Allegiance (which is there declared a Duty to the Regnant Prince)* were thence to have no Protection; and this was perfectly conformable to the design of the Law; which was the *defence of the Possessor's Title*, and the *security of the Subject's* adhering to it. Now this Law was made (I observe) under a Prince, who, in his own, and his Wife's Right, had all the Title which any Man can now insist on. His own Title only, had the Cession and Submission of those who stood before it, to be pleaded in its favour: And we cannot doubt but that he had the Cession of his Wife also. At least, if *presumptive consent* will go so far, as we ever and anon hear it will, from the Gentlemen of your Persuasion; there is more Reason to believe it in the Case of this Statute, than

in the Case of any other made by our *non-Hereditary* Princes. I have often heard our *Non-jurors* wish, that the *Bill of Exclusion* had been passed, whilst there was a *proper Authority* to alter the Succession. Tho' they opposed it at the time when it was depending, yet in consideration of the Mischiefs, which have since befallen us thro' the want of it, they have been convinced, it would have proved a beneficial Law. Now I would only here make this use of their acknowledgment, that the Statute of *Henry VII.* had an Authority as unquestionable, as that *Bill of Exclusion* could have pretended to, had it been passed in Form; that it hath declared the Allegiance of the Subject due to the *King for the time being*; that we are to *serve him in his Wars*; (without exception of any Person against whom we may not serve him) and are not only *indemnified* for this, but told moreover, that we are *bound* to serve him. Wherefore, if the Law of our Country be the Rule of our Obedience, I cannot conceive how Words can make a Case clearer than these have made it; nor how you can acquit your self without giving our

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present Sovereign the Securities he demands of you. Nor was this a *new* Doctrine in our Constitution, calculated only for the exigencies of a present *Conjuncture*, but (as you may gather from the preceding Instances, of full Sovereign Power, acknowledged *in* Kings *de facto* by Kings *de jure*, when the *latter* were most concerned in point of Interest as well as of Resentment, to deny it) our *Constitution* it self was always favourable to it; and accordingly you will give me leave to add, as a farther Remark,

3. That you will not be able to produce any number of Dissenters from it; *any*, from whom you can derive a Precedent for *Non-juring*. Even the famous Bishop *Merks* did not refuse to qualifie himself for sitting in the first Parliament of King *Henry* the IVth. The Instances which may be given of *Rebels* to our *de facto* Princes, prove them no more to have been *Non-jurors*, than the present Rebellion will prove the E. of *M—r*, or Mr. *F—r* to be so. But there is not a Writer of Note, who lived near their Times and mentions their Conduct, who doth not also brand it with its proper Reproaches,
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of *Treason, Perjury, and Rebellion*; their Attempts were called *execrable*, and the Men of most esteem for Sanctity and Religion, adhered to the Possessor of the Crown against the *Hereditary Pretender*, with all imaginable Zeal. Look into *Henry of Huntington, Roger de Hoveden, William of Malmsbury, or the Annals of Waverley*: Or see each of them cited in the *Defence* of the Tract I have recommended to you; and you will find them all concurring in the same Opinion. From what Topick therefore, of Authority or Reason, do you derive your present Practice? You will not, I presume, talk to me of a *Divine Right* in your Case; at least you have not hitherto talked in that manner; Or, if you should, I must insist upon it to have *Chapter and Verse* produced to me, before I can come into it. The *New Testament*, so far as it meddles with any Case like ours, favours the Possessor, who in our Saviour's time, had most certainly broken in upon the Rights of the *Roman People*, as well as upon the *Jewish Polity and Government*; and the *Instances* deducible from the *Old Testament*, (for *Precepts* there are none, which can

in any construction be thought to oblige us ; these Instances, I say) sometimes countenance the *Hereditary Claimant*, and at other times do nothing like it. The most favourable Characters of the Rulers there recorded, are not however taken from *Primogeniture*, of *Sem* and *Noah*, and *Abraham*, and *Jacob*, and *David*, and *Solomon* ; it is Disputed, whether some of them were the Eldest of their respective Families ; and absolutely *certain*, that *others* of them were not : So that from Scriptural Examples, till I find some given, I shall take it for granted we cannot be determined. If the *Law of Nature* had prescribed to us in this Point, we should surely have found a more general Concurrence in it ; such as in Fact we find, wherever there is any pretence to such an Authority. But if your Resort at last be to *Human Laws*, these have in some measure been considered ; and if they were less clear than they are, I know, I profess, of no *Human Laws* but what are changeable by *Human Authority*. It is a Solecism which common Sense will never digest, to blend the two Idea's together, of *Human* and *unalterable*. 'Tis impossible
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that the one should be predicated of the other. But,

You will object perhaps to me, the Consequence of my Notion, and will tell me, that it encourages every successful Usurpation. To which,

4. I reply, and say no, it doth not. For Instance an *Oliver* would not thence be Justified. King *Charles* the First was never dispossessed of his Throne, any otherwise, than a Man is dispossessed of his Estate, upon which Thieves or Robbers have made a forcible Entry. There is in this Case no need of a Judgment from *Westminster-Hall* to re-instate the owner; But he recovers his own in course, without a Trial for it, when the Rogues have left him; and the Tenants will be obliged to acknowledge him for their Landlord. In a *Legal Sense*, K. *Charles* was never out of Possession, the States of the Realm never had the Question put to them, whether he or any one else were their *Rightful Sovereign*, so long as they had any Power left them, they acted under him as their Head: So that they themselves did never pretend that he was out of Possession; tho' they forcibly prevented

vented the exercise of his Power. Wherefore my Argument in favour of a King *de facto*, is only to be understood of such an one as the States of the Realm have acknowledged, and handed to the People as such, by vesting him with the known and received marks of Imperial Power. These are the proper Judges of a *litigated Succession*, and were declared to be so in the Case depending between *Henry VI.* and *Edward IV.* by all the ordinary Judges of the Realm. And surely *these* are much fitter for so great a purpose, than every Private Person, who otherwise must be left to judge of it. My Opinion therefore is so far from unhinging Governments, or from favouring any future Innovations, that it abhors nothing more, attaches me firmly to our present Settlement, and obliges me to serve the Prince whom I find upon the Throne, with all Fidelity and Zeal. The Question how he came there, whether I am, or am not able to account for it, lies not before me. His being there, discharges him of all Defects, and entitles him to my Allegiance. I am thence obliged to oppose all Attempts against him, within my Sphere and Station, to the utmost of my Power : But if not-
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withstanding all the Opposition which I can make to such Attempts against him, a superior Power prevails, and *determines* his Possession, and in virtue of that Power, another Person by force or compact, obtains it, and the States of the Realm invest that other Person with the known Ensigns of the Royal Dignity, my Allegiance still goes in its former Channel, and our Laws (which are the Rules of it) will ever fix it upon the *Possessor*. My Oath to my Sovereign obliges me to *bear faithful and true Allegiance to him*. What this Allegiance is, our Laws have told me; but have no where told me that it is, or can be due to any Person besides the *Possessor*. So that when his Possession ceases, my *Allegiance*, which I promise in conformity to the Law enjoining it, must in all reason be measured by that Law, and therefore must cease with the said *Possession*: For indeed ceasing to *Possess* with *us* is ceasing to be King; I am sure the plainest Construction which can be made of the Statute in the 11 *Henry VII.* points out to me this Sense, and so indeed doth the whole Frame of our Constitution before it: Nor can we suppose a Merciful

ciful Prince would desire more of his Subjects, who will be so gracious as to consider, that Government in general is the Will of Providence for the Advantage, and not for the Destruction of Mankind ; that if his Subjects continue true to him, as long as they see a Possibility of serving him, it is all which he can have reason to demand of them, and all indeed, which the ends of Government do require ; that there is not, in all likelihood, a Family now Reigning upon Earth, but what owes the *Rise* of its Power to that same vicissitude of human Affairs, which may in some juncture or other put an *end* to it; and therefore when such a juncture comes, he will only expect from them their best Endeavours to prevent the effects of it; and upon the failure of such Endeavours, he will hold them excused (as our Laws most plainly do) for submitting when they cannot help it, and for paying thenceforwards their Allegiance, where the Laws direct it. There is a very plain distinction, to our present purpose, founded in the Book of *Deuteronomy*, if you will compare it with the subsequent directions of the Prophet *Jeremiah*; In the former Book we find the *Jews* forbidden

to set a Stranger over them, or any who *Deut. 17.*
 was not of their Brethren; and yet in the 15.
 latter, we may read them command-
 ed, to bring their Necks under the Yoke *Jer. 27. 12.*
 of the King of Babylon; that is, indeed
 to submit to him. And again—To
 seek the peace of the City, in which they
 were Captives; because in the Peace there-
 of, they were to have Peace, that is, they *ibid 29. 7.*
 were Members of the Community,
 enjoyed the Protection of its Govern-
 ment, and therefore owed it a return
 of Duty. Agreeably to which Baruch
 (that Prophet's scribe) exhorted them
 to pray for the Life of Nebuchodonosor,
 and for the Life of Balthasar his Son; un- *Bar 1. 11.*
 der whose Shadow (or Protection) they li- *12.*
 ved. From the former Passage we
 may observe; that the Jews were not
 at Liberty to set over them another
 King (which our *de facto* Doctrine will
 not admit of,) but yet when the Issues
 of Providence, and the result of things,
 had in fact set another over them, and
 they were settled under his Govern-
 ment, they were to pray for the Peace
 of his Kingdom, and for the safety of
 his Person. It is apparent hence, that
 Obedience may be due from us to a
 Power, which it was not Originally
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lawful for us to *constitute*: And this consideration is sufficient to justify the Conduct of those who Swore to King *William* after the Revolution, and yet were not active in bringing him hither. I presume you have been formerly of this Opinion, or else I cannot imagine upon what Principles you acted in that Reign. I meddle not now with the case of those, who were active against King *James II.* before the Recognition of King *William* by the States of the Realm. They have pleaded their own cause from various Topics of Law and Reason, upon the discussion of which I shall not enter, because my present Argument will stand without them; I chuse to dispute as little with you as possible, and therefore to insist upon things and Circumstances, which you are least inclined to question or deny. I proceed accordingly, and ask you; when King *James* had given such occasion of Discontent to *all*, and to *some* an handle for calling in a Foreign Power, to save what was most dear to them: When they were so successful in this Attempt, that the King in a fright forsook his Kingdom, and threw away the great Instrument

Instrument of his Government; tho' he *then* was most wanted to compose our Disorders; when the only means left us for settling upon any Foundation, called loudly for assembling the *States of the Realm*; when they (the only Judges for that purpose) were accordingly assembled, to consider the Condition and Posture of their Country; when these things were so, I would, I say, ask you, what Authority any private Person at that time had, (and all but the *States so assembled* were private Persons) to contradict their declared Sentiments; to say the *Throne was filled*, when they said it was *vacant*, or to alter the disposition which they made of it, to King *William* and Queen *Mary*? If any Man will take upon him to say, that they did unjustly; I take it upon me to say, 'tis a question not at all before him: Either such a Determination ought to end the Controversy, or else there can never be an end of it; if these are not the *proper Judges* in Cases of this Nature, there are none upon Earth; and then the Controversy about the *Persons of Governors* will do as much Mischief to Mankind, as the *Benefits of Government*

can ever compensate. But since all Law and Usage favour the *Possessor*; since his Legislative Power is acknowledged by the most Indisputable Authorities; since we thence are told, that our *Allegiance* to him is our *bounden Duty*, and that our acting against him in favour of an *Hereditary Pretender*, will stand in need of a Pardon, even from that *Pretender*, when he comes into Possession, before we can be *Legal Persons*, or *recti in curia*; since *Human Laws* have gone thus far towards settling the Measure and Object of our *Allegiance*; and since the *Laws of God* have no where contradicted them; to me this evidence is perfectly satisfactory; I am not only convinced, that I may, but that I *ought* likewise to give our present Sovereign the Securities he requires from me, that *I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to him*. And this single Promise, which is all that is required by the Oath of *Allegiance*, leaves me under no sort of difficulty as to that of *Abjuration*; for if my *Allegiance* be due to *King GEORGE*, I am sure it cannot be due to any other Person at the same time; and therefore if I take the *former* Oath sincerely, I may
with

with the same Sincerity declare my belief, that no other Person *hath any Manner of Right or Title* to the Crown of this Realm: For as I know of no Right, but what must be founded in the Laws either of *God or Man*, I can truly say, that I believe the *Laws of God* have left the determination of all such Cases to the *Laws of Man*; and the *Laws of Man* have determined my *Allegiance* to the *Possessor* of the Throne; to that Person whom I have seen vested with the known marks of Royalty; who receives my Tribute, and whose *Image and Superscription* give value and currency to the Coin of our Kingdom: So that when I affirm our Sovereign to be *Rightful* as well as *Lawful* King, I mean no more by it, than, that his Legal Title is not opposed by a Right which is founded in any superior Law. Then, as to my saying that, *I make this Recognition willingly*; it is true, that I do so, if I believe my self, whilst I make it; tho' I should not perhaps have made it, if the Law had not required me, since Oaths are not indeed to be taken, except the Voice of a Magistrate demand them; we are not, I would

would say, to take them for our own Pleasure's or Fancy's sake, without a proper Call to them. And then we may be said to take them *willingly*, when our Consciences do not object to them : For surely, whatever I may do without Remonstrances from that Quarter, I ought to do *willingly* and chearfully, in Obedience to the Commands of a just Authority. But you will not, I foresee, be content that the Matter should rest here ; you go on with your Complaints, and say, that it is hard a Son should suffer for the Faults and Follies of his Father ; and most of all unprecedented, that Religion should bar his enjoyment of a Crown to which he would otherwise be entituled. To this therefore I reply,

5. That in the course of human Affairs, it cannot be avoided, but that some hardships will befall particular Persons, which yet the Persons themselves who are most affected by them, ought to bear with, in consideration of the Common Good. What think you, for Instance, of those Laws which entail some part of the punishment due to Felony, or Treason, upon the Heirs of the Offender, by tainting his Blood,
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and seizing his Estate? Are not his Children sufferers by this treatment of their Father? Are not they hence debarred of a Fortune, perhaps of a Title, and of divers good Lordships, and Mannors with it; in which upon the death of their Father, their *Hereditary Claim* would in course have vested them? The meer Difference, which may be here suggested, between the Case of a King, and that of a Subject, affects not the *Justice* of this Treatment, with regard to the One, or to the Other; since the Son of a *Duke* may have Injustice done him, as much as the Son of a *King*; and the Son of a *Plowman* as much as *either*. Indeed the Higher the Person is, and the greater the Dignity of which he is by these means deprived, so much the more *Pity* we shall naturally bestow upon him; but as to the *Justice* of the Case, if it be just to deprive an innocent Son of 100 *l.* for the Miscarriages of his Father, in consideration of Publick Good; it may be as just to deprive him of an 100,000 *l.* upon the *same* Consideration. Whether the Publick Good be, or be not concerned, in excluding the *Pretender*, is a Question properly before those
Judges

Judges only, to whom the Care of our National Interest is committed. But still I consider, that even an *erroneous Decision* of theirs may be binding to *Private Persons*, as much as an *erroneous Judgment* of the Courts at *Westminster*, must stand for Law, till it be reversed by a competent Authority. If we might be permitted to suppose a Thing so undecent, as that those Courts were corrupt or partial in any Judgment; and if you and I should happen to know they were so, yet we might not take upon us to right the Sufferer by *extra-judicial Methods*; nay, if our Place and Station called upon us to do it, we ought to give our Assistance (as a Sheriff, suppose of a County, would be obliged to do) for the peaceable Entrance of the new Possessor, upon the Estate which the Law should vest in him, even by the *corrupt* or *erroneous Sentence* of her Judges. And upon these Principles, I think you might submit to our present Government, even tho' you should believe that the Persons who formed our Settlement, had injured the *Pretender*, by disallowing his Claim: For if human Establishments are alterable by any Authority

thority upon Earth, (and it would be a strange Absurdity to say that they are not) the change of our Succession from the Line of King *James*, to that of King *George*, hath all the Authority, as well as all the Necessity to vouch for it, which any such Alteration can ever be supposed to have. We could not expect that King *James* himself would ever consent to it ; but it hath all the Authority by which this Nation hath been ever governed, to be pleaded for its Validity. The *Legislative* and *Executive* Powers, have both concurr'd in it ; the *States of the Realm* have declared it and sworn to it, and all Orders of Men amongst us have done the same. Look into the Original of any human Constitution, or of the Family it self, to which you so attach your Principles and your Fortunes, and see whether any of them were better founded. I argue (you observe) upon the supposal of the *Pretender's Legitimacy*, which yet should have been better ascertained to the proper *Witnesses*, at the Time of his Birth. For as to the Affidavits, afterwards made, and said to be enrolled in the *Chancery*, when the *People's* Su-

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spicions

spicions grew formidable to the *Court*, they have not, I must acknowledge, that Weight with me, which the Customary Evidence, in Cases of that Nature, would have had. And I am the less moved by them, when I consider, that the *Court* well knew what Suspicions the *People* had entertained *before-hand*, of a Design to palm a *Prince of Wales* upon them, which therefore in all common Sense and Reason should have determined the Managers to the most open and allowed Methods of Procedure, if the Case could in any manner have been brought to bear with it. I am content, however, to go on with you in my former Course, and to take the *Legitimacy* of his Birth for *granted*, tho' it be by no Means *undoubted*. You say 'tis an Hardship, that his Father's Miscarriages should make him a Sufferer: And so say I of all Attainders, and of the Children suffering by them. But if it be a *necessary* Hardship, the Publick Good will justify it. Now the Children of other Attainted Persons (supposing that they were permitted to enjoy the Estates or Honours of their Fathers) would not be in any like
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Condition of hurting the Community, as the Son of King *James* would be. He would come hither with all the Resentment, which a Succession of supposed Injuries done to himself, and to his Father for many Years together, could inspire him with: He hath contracted a Debt, which the exhausted Treasury of *France* would be very glad to see repaid, and which must swell to a Sum we should be hard put to it to raise, after our past Expences: The Funds which our Legislative hath mortgaged, would be all at the Mercy of a Prince, who, if ever he should come here, would know we have no Resort to betake to, let him use us as he pleases; and if he should have a Ministry enterprising enough to seize, what they would have Pretences enough to say was forfeited, he might establish himself in the most Arbitrary Degree of Power which any Nation ever felt from an Imperial Crown. What Renunciations of our present Engagements may be then demanded (and from many of us perhaps extorted) I forbear to press upon you, who are unconcerned in them; but you must give us leave, who have taken

them, to think with Horror of the manifold Perjuries which will be expected from us, if we believe our *present Engagements Lawful*. Only under this melancholly View, we have the Comfort of a reasonable Assurance, That if we continue true to *them*, it will be morally impossible for him to force his Way to us. We have heard enough of our present King's being a *Stranger* to us: But now, is the *Pretender less so*, because he spent the four first Months of his Life amongst us? Have we ever known what use he would make of Power? Hath he been tried in Government, or do we guess what Figure he would make in it? Whither, in the Name of Truth and common Sense, would we suffer our Discontents to carry us? We have a Settlement subsisting upon as good a Foundation as the Nature of the Thing would admit, and as the Original of any human Settlement, which I know of, upon Earth ever had. To this our Obedience is required by the whole Course of our Laws, made long *before* it, as well as upon the *present Occasion*. The Legislative hath claimed to it self a Power (and if it had not claimed

claimed it, the Nature of the Thing ^{13 Eliz.} would have spoken its Power) to alter ^{ch. 1.} the Succession; nay, and hath made it *penal* in the Subject to deny this Claim. It hath intimated (as it knew) no Difference between the *de Jure* and *de Facto* Legislator. The Authority of *both* is equally indeed proclaimed by Immemorial Usage, attested by the most Authentick Vouchers, and alike supported by the whole Frame of our Constitution. Upon this we would break in for the sake of a Prince, unknown to us, bred in a Rival Court and Country, whose Maxims in every Point of Religion and Policy, are diametrically opposite to ours; obliged to it for his own and his Father's Support and Maintenance; incensed against the Bulk of our People, for their repeated Oaths, and Endeavours to defeat him of what he calls his *Right*; and finally, devoted to a Religion obliging him to keep no Faith which he shall pledge to us for the Security of our Ecclesiastical or Civil Liberties. *This* is the hopeful Exchange we are so fond of making! And with it would entail a Succession of Popish *Heads* upon a Protestant *Body* for all Generations.

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Should he be married (as I have heard divers of your Perswasion boasting that he is already) to a Lady of the *Roman* Communion; what then have we to expect but the Education of his Children in their Parents Religion? Or if he should die without Issue, we know where the *Hereditary Claim* must carry us; and this *Protestant* Country, so long as it shall continue so, must for ever be Governed by *Popish* Princes. You insist, I find, that it is a Thing *unprecedented*, for Religion to bar a Prince's Title to his Crown. On the contrary, I would ask you, whether you can name an Example of a *Protestant Prince* permitted to reign in a *Popish Country*? And tho' the Inconvenience would even *there*, I confess, be great, yet it is much greater in the case of a *Popish Prince* over a *Protestant Country*. For the *Protestant* holds no Principle destructive to the Interests of his *Popish* Subjects. He may keep his *Faith* once plighted to them with a *good Conscience*, and is no way obliged to *Dragoon* them into his own Religion, or to *plunder* their *Estates* for the *Salvation* of their *Souls*. Thus we have seen a Neighbouring Prince

Prince exercising his Power over that part of his Subjects, whose Misfortune it was to differ from his Religion! What advances were made amongst us towards the like Practices, or towards the power of dealing like Measure to us, as it should be judged convenient, I am sorry to find so soon forgotten, as I am, that the present Flea-bite of *reparable Grievances*, is more uneasy to us, than a just apprehension of those *irreparable Mischiefs* our Constitution must sustain, by unravelling the Scheme which hath been so long in *forming*, and is just now upon the point of *finishing*. *Convenience*, or *Inconvenience*, is not, I am aware, with you, the *Decisive Argument*; you profess to be governed by a *superior motive of Conscience*, and to submit these *lower Considerations* to the Fate which shall attend them. How far *Conscience* is concerned in this Question, hath been already examined; and from what hath been either urged, or referred to upon this occasion, I hope it may appear, that the *Rule of Conscience*, with regard to our present Duty, should be entirely adjusted by the *Ordinances of Man*, 1 Pet. 2. 13. to which *Submission* is enjoined us for
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Rom. 13. 1. *the Lord's sake*; as we are likewise told, that the *Powers which be, are ordained of God*: 'Tho' I am sure, you will grant to me, that the Powers which were then in Being, had no long pretence to an *Hereditary Title*; and I am as sure, that our Laws have never favour'd it in opposition to the present *Possessor*. Wherefore, if you will not be perswaded to settle your Rule of Duty to your Sovereign upon Constitution-Principles, I very much fear you will never come to a proper Issue upon the case before you. That *Utopian Scheme*, which some of Dr. *Higden's* Answerers were pleased to charge upon his Notions, is with far greater propriety imputable to the Gentlemen of your Persuasion; who have engaged in the defence of Principles which have neither *Divine Precept*, nor *general Practice* to be pleaded in their favour.

But my dear Friend, I am sorry to find, that this, or any other Juncture should oblige me, to enter upon a Dispute with you; with whom I believed and hoped, I might always have lived in a perfect Harmony. Yet as we agree so well and so entirely, in every thing, which our holy Profession doth
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more particularly call upon us to fludy with all exactness; we may surely allow to each other with the more Forbearance, any Errors we shall fall into upon subjects of a different Nature; in which we cannot be supposed *so* Conversant. Upon the whole; if you could by any means be persuaded to believe, that those Recognitions are *Lawful*, which the Government requires from you, I cannot but think you would come in to an acknowledgment, that they are *necessary* from you in such a remarkable Crisis. You could not believe them *lawful*, except you believed the Government to be so, to which you should make them; and if you believe that a *Lawful* Government, you must likewise confess your Obligation of Obedience to it. And whatever you *pay*, you may surely profess, and Promise, and Swear you *will* pay. The Juncture is such, as most reasonably demands those Securities to the Government, which are now insisted on; and you weaken its Interest by refusing to give them.

If indeed, after all which can be urged to you, you still continue persuaded, that you are *Right* in your Re-

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fusal; I am sure, I should be very *Wrong* in suggesting any Motives to you, which have not a tendency to *convince* your *Judgment* as well as to *gain upon* your *Practice*. I presume and hope, that no one will *now* imagine, you act an interested part, in foregoing a present (comfortable) subsistence, for any distant Prospect of a Recompence from you know not *whom*, nor *when*. My part in this Circumstance is somewhat harder than *your's*; People will more easily be induced to think that by writing for the *Possessor*, I make my *Court* to him, whilst I forfeit nothing but my Time, and Ink, and Paper, by it; than they will or can imagine, that you have any view beyond that of *Conscience*; I am as fond as you can be, of maintaining this Character, and indeed as I am of any one thing in Life. But yet I would not sacrifice the *thing* to the *name* of it. I have always sorted with that Class of Men, who stand now most suspected by the Government, of having been, and being, disaffected to it. I can answer for my self, and you can for me, that *I never* was so. Yet since more discontent hath appeared from
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from our Quarter, than I have always thought consistent with the Principles of our Religion, or indeed with the true Interest of our Country : I could not satisfy my self without giving to the World this publick Testimony, that all the Men of a Tory-Denomination are not embarked in the same Design. Some few besides me have done the like; and I know many more, who would take any fair occasion of, approving their firm Adherence to the present Establishment, but for the reproaches they apprehend from *one* sort of Men, without the least expectation of any favourable acceptance from *another*. They must excuse me, if I think their Reason insufficient; I would do what I apprehend my Duty, let others say or think as they please of it. *Our* Oaths indeed (who have taken them) might with great justice be accepted as satisfactory, if there were not too many Instances of Indifference and Coldness, as to any sense of their Obligation; and if some had not gone so far, as expressly to deny, that an Oath, which is forcibly imposed, carries any Obligation with it. These I believe and hope, and dare almost affirm, are few

in the Comparison: But if there be any where a set of such monstrous Casuists, it is time the World should be warned of them, as the very Bane and Pests of Human Society ; who are giving up one of its strongest Ligaments, and sacrificing the Third Commandment to no higher, nor better Reason, than what in proper Time, and Place, and Juncture, and Temptation, must be allowed to invalidate all the rest. For if I may forswear my self for a livelihood, I would fain know, why I may not commit Idolatry, Murder, Theft, or bear false Witness, upon the same Consideration. These are Men who are too Wicked, or too contemptible to be argued with. They are fitter for the Magistrate's *Correction*, than for any one's *Instruction*. But *those* (we know) are none of our Brethren. You have given to the World a Noble specimen of what *Conscience* can do against the most prevailing of worldly Motives : I even envy you the Honour of such a truly Christian self-Denial ; and have only to wish, that you had chosen an Occasion of exercising it, wherein I might have followed you with a *Conscience void of offence*

fence towards God and Man. My Conscience, which permits, doth, at the same time, oblige me to obey the Demands of my King and Country, and to give them the Securities which they Legally require from me. I have here adventured to go a Step further; and to publish the Reasons of my Practice. I have waited a while to see, whether this would not be done by some fitter Hand, and from the suspected Quarter. For I must freely own my Opinion to you, that where there hath been Umbrage either *given* or *taken* between *King* and *Subject*; the *Subject* should shew the most and earliest sollicitude to remove it. *Senties qui vir siem*, is no proper Language to come out of a Mouth which hath always professed the most submissive Obedience: You had not however, received that rouble of this from me, if I had found Instances enough besides, to have attoned for the Folly of some of our late Managements: The few which have appeared, have been so roughly handled, that I care not for my own part to put my Head out of Doors without a Cloak, or Shelter: And indeed I have too great a regard
for

for you, to give the World an occasion of suspecting the Person I *Write to*, by knowing the *Writer*: Nor would I detract from the Weight of any thing which hath been here offered, by furnishing the least Handle to such as may be fond of saying, or surmizing, that I serve any Cause in it besides that of Truth. Should my Name, by any Accident, creep into the World, they who know me, would have no reason to say or think, that Times and Seasons have made any Change in me. But, as I have always acted upon a stedfast belief of the Principles here laid before you, they who would suggest an alteration in *me*, must look for it in *themselves*; and if they have in any thing departed from their former Professions, they expect from me more complaisance than there is in my Nature, when they would have me follow them. *Principles* are things immovable; and with *them* they may always find me; but *Persons* are fickle and humorous; and therefore I shall stand where I do, till they are enough either *pleased* or *tired* with their Ramble, to be content with returning to their former Station. And as this is
the

the Ground I have ever stood upon, so I see no Reason to change it because my Prospect is not always the same from it. Herein I am sure, you will perfectly agree with me, as you do in every thing else, except the unhappy Subject of our present Debate; and I pray God, that to a mind so Honest and Upright as yours, *even this Truth* may also be *revealed*.

I am,

My Reverend and dear Brother,

Ever Yours, &c.



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the Ground I have enclosed
to I have enclosed to the
my property is not above the
some. I have enclosed to the
with me as you can see
every thing, and I have
of our property, and I
pay for the same, and I
and I have enclosed to the
a very good receipt.



I am,

My Respectful and Obedient Servant,

Wm. L. G. Young, Esq.

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